Len C. Rodman, Chairman, President and CEO of Black & Veatch, said today that stimulus funding in energy, transportation and water infrastructure will provide the greatest returns in achieving U.S. economic recovery, job growth, greater efficiency and productivity.
   
In a column issued today, Rodman stated that longer-term investments in foundational infrastructure are needed to provide a more stable base of employment and sustainable benefits. The column “Spending Should Target Infrastructure That Repays Massive Investment” is available, click link.    
   
“The goal of investing in the nation’s infrastructure as part of the economic recovery deserves widespread support and quick action,” Rodman said. “And we must look beyond simple U.S. roads and bridge infrastructure investments if we are to realize a wide-ranging and sustainable economic rejuvenation.”
   
In the column, Rodman explains how funding in such sectors as mass transit, railroads, energy and water not only helps jump-start and sustain the U.S. economy, but also leads to improvements in efficiency and better utilization of vital infrastructure. In addition, Rodman advises that such investments will bolster the basic construction industry as well as technology and manufacturing industries where the use of equipment that supports these needs drives a much wider base of the economy.
      
“In the long-run it’s critical that the country gain competitive advantages that are part of the solution to repay the massive debt we are incurring,” Rodman said.   

Len C. Rodman
Black & Veatch
http://www.bv.com/

Lessons Learned from Fatal Events - Alternatives and consequences

Industrial Accident Analysis Dichotomy 
• Search for the real cause and implement effective corrective actions
• Or find the “appropriate person to blame” and do nothing else

Based in the article See & Flee in the Petrochemical Industry, by Jim Whiting and on 32 years of personal experience in design start-up, operation, and troubleshooting of direct reduction plants worldwide.

Investigations on fatal events in industrial plants in Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and the North Sea, as well as in Australia according to Jim Whiting, bring a question to mind.
 
Were the workers aware that the mine conditions were unsafe and was that awareness translated into actions to reduce the risk?  Or was the risk accepted as part of the job?

Especially after the recent evidence at Pasta de Conchos (explosion in a coal mine in Northern Mexico), and the “heroic” declarations of some politicians: “We will not rest until we have found and punished the person responsible!”

Particularly, in one of the companies where I was employed, a few years ago, two operators died in an explosion, there was a ball a fire that covered them during one of the product discharges.  Unfortunately this was not an isolated event.

I remember the work environment and the spirit that moved us.  Production is first, personal security was never mentioned, even though the official speech would say otherwise.   We thought we were expected to be “machos”.

Nobody wanted to appear as a “chicken”.

In that period, even the use of dust masks was socially unacceptable.  The use of fall arresting harnesses indicated fear or insecurity, and was taken as a bad example for the rest of the workers. 

“Nothing is going to happen!  We have worked like this for more than 35 years; we are not going to back up now, are we?”   This was said to me by one of the company’s VP’s, when he wanted to install a video camera in the open discharge of one of the new reactors.  When I was explaining to him that the camera had open electronic components and that the atmosphere was explosive, and that the dust was electrically conductive, he said to me “we’re not going to chicken-out, are we?”  

I had to think fast and melt the fuses in the camera, so that we could not use it.  I then designed a rig to put the camera in with minimum risk.  The end result was there was indeed an explosion, but, fortunately, nobody was hurt, as they were using the appropriate equipment. 

I lost the opportunity to move up in the administrative ladder, as there were two Vice Presidents and one Manager looking down into the reactor that day!

Explosions in the reactor’s charge and discharge were frequent; the balls of fire were, literally, fireworks.   The personnel would play, throwing objects from high platforms to the new engineers.  We would laugh at their fear when they heard an unexpected (for them), explosion. 

Intoxicated employees and flames during maintenance and operation were part of the environmental conditions, especially in some of the loading bins and quench towers, where, more than once, we retrieved unconscious, burnt and, sometimes, deceased personnel.

Reports and discussions were confronted with opinions from people in higher positions with no on-site experience, or that were so brave as to not visualize the danger.  A report on a risky situation was a sign of not wearing the company’s T-shirt, and it was a terminal career move.

But we never ran, we would always return to work, once the ball of flame had passed.  Actually, we were really never afraid.  Nobody reported anything, we all knew the environment we worked in and we considered it exciting and part of our work.  Those who would stay away were criticized and stigmatized.
  
The question now is, how do we train the operators and maintenance personnel on when to run or when to be “macho”? 

When is it OK to be afraid?  

Unfortunately, in Mexico, the consequences for a fatal accident in a company are few, even though the official speech may deny it.  So there are hardly any effective motivational and disciplinary policies, besides signs and useless statistics. 

In some cases, the consequences have been limited to the loss of production, during the time it took to clean-up.      

In Australia, in comparison, a plant can be shut-down indefinitely.

In other countries, the insurance company can refuse to pay de damages, and fines for a fatality are charged automatically, even before the investigation, and they can be considerable.  

Even so, “the culture of production is first”, it is universal… and it extends to nuclear installations and even to NASA.

And the phobia to use the emergency shut-down button also.

Many years ago, when we were beginning to make use of computers to control chemical plant operations, we decided to install controlled shut-down buttons, baptized as “the panic” buttons.

Few of us could clearly see the conditions under which they should be activated.

We only knew that shutting down a complex installation without assistance from the control system was very difficult, due to the number of variables that the operator had to have in mind.  (This button was installed after a catastrophic incident, similar, in sequence, but not in consequence, to the one in Chernovyl.) 

Each operator would establish the criteria for activating the “panic” button.

An unfortunate name as it implied the lack of ability of the person who activated it.  Our people were reluctant to activate the “panic” button, as it meant that they were afraid of something.

Years later an effort was made to change its name to CSB (Controlled Shutdown Button), a difficult task in the petrochemical industry.  At least the name was changed in some drawings! 

Later on, due to the persistence of one of the production managers, the shutdown button was used every time they had to shutdown the plant.  So the “panic” part of activating the button was finally lost, and became a very comfortable addition to the operation environment. 

A related incident happened not long ago, two operators followed by a Manager went to a platform to correct a problem.   They all knew they could have the option of shutting down the plant, nevertheless, they decided to solve the problem, without using the panic button.

The apparent process control loss and the record of recent repeated plant shutdowns made them take a high risk decision that took their lives. 

The situation had never been analyzed or drilled. 
 
They made the wrong decision as a team (they did not work as a team; they supported the wrong decision due to an incorrect concept of solidarity.

The technical problem was finally tracked to a poor control loop tuning (the plant had been built using multiple contractors, each one supplying its own control system); the conflicts between control systems led them to block all but one computer during start-up, a shortcut that would cost them dearly. 

But the issue here is, what led them to decide to put their lives on the line, when there was the option of shutting down the plant and starting-up again?

As with all investigations, pertaining to human performance problems, the principal challenge is to:

• Analyze which were the “good reasons” that made them take that risk. 
• See what they took into account that made them believe that their opportunities of winning were better than those of loosing.

All this behavior depends on the perception of risk.  Which was and is the perception of risk of the miners in the coal mine industry?

Three perceptions have been considered for this incident, at least, to try to interpret the motivation of the operators that died and the rest of the personnel involved.

1. One setting could be that they intentionally, or unintentionally, did, or did not do something that had created the problem, and they believed that they could correct the problem before anyone else could find out, possibly to avoid a professionally embarrassing situation or for fear of disciplinary actions.  To activate a stop button and shutdown the plant would make everyone aware of the problem.  They believed that, if they could solve the problem without stopping the process, then nobody would find out what had happened.   In that particular case somebody had pushed the start-up button again, resetting the computer block-out during start-up.  (The buttons were too close together and the operator’s attention was on controlling a dome.)

2. The second setting is that the emergency stop button had been given the name of “panic button” or “chicken button”.  During our investigations we discovered:

• That there was a cultural expectation established among all the workers and management process, that the plant should not shut down for any change, unless you were “chicken”.
• Management would award those who were known to have been able to make a change without shutting down the plant. (They would also give more importance to the people who spoke English, no matter how inefficient they were.)
• This perception was reinforced when management would give contradictory or ambiguous messages referring to when to use the emergency stop button or the shutdown control button to stop the plant.  
• Management honestly said that they had never told the operators not to use the stop button, and they probably frequently said otherwise, “your safety is more important than the process”, you have the power to shutdown the plant when you consider it necessary” and other similar euphemisms.
• BUT there had been some previous incidents when someone had shut the plant down and management had commented almost simultaneously, “Yes, you should have pressed the stop button, BUT we lost $250,000 Dollars worth of production”.  The message that was relayed to the operators was ambiguous and they were left with a feeling that they had done something wrong.
• Adding to this, the personal image of the plant manager was that of a GI at work, people were afraid of discussing any issue with him.

You will agree that, frequently, the influence or pressure of our peers or bosses can have a great effect on how we perceive risk and how we perform in our jobs.

The third perception is familiar to all who have started plants up.  There are many actions required in a plant start-up.  There is much equipment involved and, normally, few people on hand.  Therefore, the decision to shut-down the plant also takes into consideration the perception of the amount of work and time it takes to re-start it. 

3. This third perception could be the main reason why the organization, not to say the operators, avoided activating the controlled shutdown button and do whatever possible to maintain the plant operating; in many cases not having the foresight of the risk that is being taken.

The message should be clear – and should be clear in the minds of Management, that all levels of the organization should frequently discuss the risk perceptions and risk expectations, as to how to handle tolerable/intolerable risk situations for special and real settings in their immediate work environments. 

Fatal accidents, in particular, project a provocative and valuable concept, to be considered always in the meetings prior to the work and risk evaluation. Although we cannot give the names of companies or people that are involved, we can describe the conditions that gave origin, and their consequences, hoping the lessons will be useful for all, and hoping that you will never need to live these situations. 

One of these could illustrate the case.

The operators knew, through smell, sounds and vibrations that an explosion was imminent and “saw and fled”; the supervisors stayed behind and died. 

a) What determined that the supervisors should stay behind?
b) What was their perception of risk, conscious or subconscious?
c) And, their perception of duty?
d) What finally determined their behavior, and why did they stay?
e) Why do only the good employees get hurt and, sometimes, die?
f) Did the supervisors relieve that their boss’ wanted them to stay and die?
g) Did the supervisors ignore the risk?
h) Did they accept it consciously?

Some questions come to mind:

1) Was this discussed at any moment, among themselves, as to when they should stay and solve the problems, or when to run?  Was this ever on the agenda?
2) Did their bosses ever discuss and analyze this setting at a previous meeting?
3) Did the operators consider themselves less responsible for the plant security and therefore ran?
4) Did they ever have a meeting with Management addressing this situation explicitly?
5) Was the company implicitly encouraging the supervisors to be in risky situations?
 
Using the knowledge we have gained after the incident, we ask:

Why didn’t we do what we were supposed to have done?
And now that we know what we have to do, why are we not doing it?

Confucius said at one point:

“If you know what you need to do and you do not do it,
then you are worst than before “

“To see what is right and not to do it, is want of courage”

The questions are actually simple.

From the answers, we should obtain actions to carry out, and not only assign guilt.

Actually, finding a guilty person or persons serves to satisfy the desire of vengeance; to try to destroy the opponent’s image little by little, will not reflect in substantial improvements.

The person selected as guilty will simply be substituted by someone else, possibly with less training and surely with less experience, who will be afraid of taking any decision.

Some questions that can be asked are:

• How many more settings of “see and flee” can be identified in our work places before having to take that decision when the time comes?
• Is there a trans-functional communication protocol that will inform us of other dangerous conditions?

All these questions should be made and discussed regularly, evaluating the answers, planning, practicing and stage-managing the actions and reactions within the work groups in your installation. 

In the theatre, war and emergencies…

“You are what you drill”

• A systematic incident analysis tool used in many nuclear plants and employed to find root causes and the appropriate solutions, has proven over and over, how useful it is in the proactive risk evaluating process.  For more information check their site www.taproot.com

A final challenge to be used in safety and hygiene group discussions at work is, what it means to be a hero (especially in the case of underground mining management and nuclear and petrochemical operations):

• Have you taken risks you should not have taken?
• Have you not reported deviations that could cause a tragedy, for fear of being seen as a coward?
 
To center a fatal incident analysis, in the search of someone to blame and to finish the analysis when that person is found, is a recipe for disaster.

Finding the root cause and taking the appropriate corrective actions is the only way out of the spiral.  Closely following the corrective actions, and making sure they have done their job properly, will be the first step.   If the information flow channel is kept open and objective between operation and management, this will insure further improvement, and a safer working environment.

Article by:
M. C. Marco A. Flores V.
tecmen1@gmail.com
TECMEN SA de CV
Applied Innovation

I am part of the staffing initiative for CDM, a tier-one consulting organization involved in numerous water and wastewater projects around the globe.  As business grows, so does our need to hire engineers!  I am aggressively recruiting for a number of Florida opportunities, and I am hopeful to find this blog as a new avenue to share the word.

CDM is one of the premier consulting organizations supporting the water and wastewater industry currently involved in some of the largest water treatment projects for the state of Florida.  Our firm is a full service provider with openings for PE certified, EE or CE, 6+ years of industry experience with municipal or industrial clients.

In addition - we are hiring for project managers and business development specialists!

As this is my first attempt in utilizing a blog to interact with engineers, please post to blog if there is interest to learn more.  I will respond as soon as possible.

Can't wait to hear from you,
Kristine Trecartin
CDM - 
trecartinka@cdm.com 
Phone: 617-452-6722

In "Networking on the Network" UCLA associate professor Phil Agre sets out a 66,000-word guide for PhD students on how to develop professional networking skills that can advance their careers.

His advice is on the mark for engineers and other knowledge workers as well. As befits an MIT PhD whose research interests range from information technology and institutional change to Internet culture, Agre recognized the potential of the Internet for professional networking way back in 1993, when he wrote the first version of this article.

In thinking about Agre's advice for PhDs, it seems clear that the burden to "publish or perish" has also been an advantage academics have over other professions in terms of (a) finding peers with similar professional interests, (b) building and gaining visibility in a mutually beneficial professional network, and (c) publicly sharing knowledge and expertise in print and public presentations.

If you think that it's only academics who need to develop this sort of personalized professional network, you're living in the wrong century. The growing power of online media – websites, blogs, podcasts and vlogs (video blogs) – is transforming every company into a media company, and every knowledge worker into an online reporter, editor and publisher (over internal intranets as well as the Internet).

Agre provides two tips for creating a customized professional network specific to your interests and abilities:

Articulate the commonalities you discover you have with others (which includes exploring differences). "The principle of articulating commonalities is the secret to getting along with people," Agre writes.

Find a "structural hole" in your profession that you can help fill. "A structural hole, intuitively speaking, is a bunch of people who don't know each other but ought to."

How can you find and build your own network using the Internet? "To begin with," Agre writes, "the most fundamental way of finding people online is to help them find you." The easiest way to do that is through a blog like this. If you're not blogging, or commenting on blogs, you're missing a really easy and powerful way for people of like interests to find you.

This should be a no-brainer for engineers who sell industrial equipment. But the potential benefits of blogging may be even greater for those who buy and use the equipment. Articulating your process needs and ideas online gives you the possibility of the sort of serendipitous results that come when you fill one of those "structural holes." Not to mention it gives you professional visibility in an age when invisibility can be a real drag on your career.

Don Dunnington